The Effect of a Supply-Side Educational Program on Schooling in Indonesia: A Failed Policy for Girls?

By Aurelia Schülen  and Nicolas Volkhausen


Motivation and Background

While the outcomes of most public investments schemes are not completely foreseeable, the benefits of investing in education to both children and broader society could not be more clear: education is strongly correlated with improvements in health and nutrition, it is one of the best protections against poverty, and it fosters civic participation and democratization.

Although the importance of education to individuals and society is apparent, access to education differs substantially between and within countries. In particular in developing countries the access to education is extremely restricted. Looking at within country disparities, these barriers to education often disproportionately affect girls. In the 1970s the Indonesia’s central government launched the Sekolah Dasar INPRES program (henceforth SD INPRES), one of the largest primary school construction programs in history in order to counteract this trend of stagnating primary school enrollment rates. This large-scale construction program led many economists to study the numerous impacts on the Indonesian population by taking advantage of its form as a natural experiment.

Previous literature on the impact of SD INPRES suggests that until recently only little attention has been paid to the effects of the primary school construction program on girls. This is not very surprising since Indonesia constantly performed poorly among international gender equality measurements such as the Gender Inequality Index by the United Nations or the Global Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum. Work by Hertz and Jayasundera (2007), Pettersson (2012), and Ashraf et al. (2014), take differing approaches in studying the effects of the SD INPRES program in women. The novelty in our approach lies in the fact that with our data set, containing more cohorts than previous analyses, we are able to check for persistency of the resulting effects of the school construction program on later cohorts by extending the time range used in Duflo’s pioneering analysis. We also investigate whether the effect of the program on women might not be reflected on the intensive margin, i.e. the actual duration of education, but rather on the extensive margin, in other words the likelihood of completing primary school education.

Identification Strategy

A key element of our identification strategy to identify causality of the school construction program on educational outcomes relies on variations of an individual’s exposure to the program based on date and region of birth. For the purpose of our analysis, we only treat the combination of these two variations as exogenous. By its nature, the SD INPRES program was designed to allocate more schools to regions where primary enrollment was particularly low, inducing heterogeneity in the number of average schools built per district. A second source of variation is reflected in the age of the students. A child of 12 years of age or older in 1974 when the SD INPRES schools started to operate, could not benefit from the program. On the other hand, a child aged 6 or younger in 1974 was young enough to fully benefit from the newly constructed schools. Similarly, children between 6 and 12 years of age in 1974 only enjoyed partial exposure to the program. If the program had an effect on an individual’s years of education, we would expect the program to have the largest effects for fully exposed cohorts, a somewhat mediocre effect on the partially exposed individuals, and no effect on children that were too old in 1974 to benefit from the program. The large, exogenous shock of the SD INPRES program enables us to differentiate between treatment and comparison groups, in the manner of a quasi-experiment using a difference-in-differences approach.

Findings

In line with previous literature, we find that the SD INPRES program had significant effects on schooling outcomes of Indonesia’s children. However, children did not benefit from the primary school construction program equally. In fact, we find substantial heterogeneity of the program’s effect between genders, mostly favoring boys over girls. On average, one more school per 1,000 children in the district of birth increased schooling duration by 0.12 to 0.21 years for boys. However, this effect is less clear-cut for women: depending on the sample specification and type of analysis, we were able to obtain significant results for women albeit substantially smaller in magnitude. In particular when breaking down the analysis on each birth year cohort, our estimates suggest that only the youngest cohorts hitherto benefited from the program, with effects ranging from 0.1 to 0.17 additional years of schooling for an additional school built in the district of birth. Such suggestive late onset of the program’s effectiveness on women motivated us to perform a persistency analysis on later female cohorts. Including eight additional birth year cohorts, we find increasing and significant effects of on average 0.2 additional years of schooling. These findings suggest that a potential effect on women’s schooling might have set in later. Our mixed evidence thus far gives rise to doubts whether the SD INPRES program worked on the extensive margin of schooling attainment. Due to possible selection disadvantages at the transition between primary and secondary school, the effect of the program for girls might not be reflected in the in years schooling but merely in their likelihood of primary school completion. We find significant but negligible effects on women’s likelihood to graduate from primary school.

Conclusion

Ideally, a policy trying to increase education should be targeted at disadvantaged groups of society in order to decrease inequality and break the vicious cycle of poverty. Our findings suggest that women in Indonesia are particularly disadvantaged when analyzing educational outcomes. Further research should hence try to identify other possible heterogeneities when stratifying the sample interest. During our analysis, we made first attempts by looking at different specifications such as the difference in effects between individuals living in rural versus urban areas, or looking at potential heterogeneity varying by ethnicity. Such deviations of our analysis might unmask further heterogeneity, which will be essential to identify when assessing and improving Indonesia’s education policy. It will therefore be necessary to devote further research and policy attention towards the long-term impacts of the program by analyzing the educational and labor market outcomes of later cohorts, captured in the SUPAS 2005 and 2015 polls. On the basis of these results it will be necessary to identify and study potential policy remedies to overcome the tremendous challenges Indonesia’s education system faces.

The effect of family income on birth weight

Editor’s note: This post is part of a series showcasing Barcelona GSE master projects by students in the Class of 2015. The project is a required component of every master program.


Authors:
Genevieve Jeffrey, Yi-Ting Kuo, Laura López and Stella Veazey

Master’s Program:
Economics of Public Policy

Paper Abstract:

We examine the effect of income on birth weight by employing two identification strategies using US Vital Statistics Natality data. First, following a study by Hoynes et al. (2015), we take advantage of an exogenous increase in income from the Earned Income Tax Credit using a difference-in-differences methodology. The Earned Income tax credit (EITC), enacted in 1975, is a refundable transfer to lower-income working families through the tax system and is one of the primary tools used in the United States to fight poverty. The EITC underwent an expansion is 1993 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act), increasing the maximum credit families with and without children could receive. Following Hoynes et al. (2015), we take advantage of the difference in maximum credit available for families with different numbers of children. We find that the increase from the EITC reduces the incidence of low birth weight and increases mean birth weight. In addition, we discover that maternal smoking and drinking behavior during gestation is reduced.

Next, in order to try to capture the effect of income on birth weight across the population (as opposed to just high-impact groups), we exploit income variation from a policy change in Alaska that allowed payments from oil wealth to be distributed to all Alaska residents. We employ a comparative case study methodology using a synthetic control group following Abadie et al. (2010). Our comparison group is comprised of a combination of North Dakota, Oregon, Delaware, Kentucky and Nevada. The analysis shows a substantial increase in Alaska’s average birth weight over its synthetic counterpart around the onset of the policy. However, we refrain from attributing the divergence to the dividend payments alone, given significant changes in Alaska’s economy that coincide with the policy and are not well-mirrored by the control states.

Presentation Slides:

What’s behind a number? Information systems and the road to universal health coverage

Adam Aten ’13 (Health Economics and Policy)alumni is a researcher at The Brookings Institution focusing on evidence development and biomedical innovation within the Center for Health Policy. Prior to joining Brookings, he was a civil servant at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services developing policy expertise in health insurance for low-income populations, digital information systems and information governance, and cost effectiveness of public health programs.

This week he has written a post for the World Bank’s Investing in Health blog on universal health coverage (UHC). Here are some excerpts:

Decision-makers now have many tools at their disposal to analyze trends and take strategic decisions – increasingly in real-time – thanks to the rapid diffusion and adoption of information and communications technologies. New approaches to collect, manage and analyze data to improve health systems learning, such as how the poor are benefitting (or not) from health care services, are helping to ensure the right care is given to the right patient at the right time, every time – the goal of UHC.

It is relatively easy to agree on public health targets, but actual progress requires a management structure supported by dashboards that can allow monitoring of intermediate outcomes in real-time.

Read the full post on the World Bank’s health blog: What’s behind a number? Information systems and the road to universal health coverage

For those interested in current health policy topics, Mr. Aten is also a chapter co-author of the recently published WB/PAHO book, Toward Universal Health Coverage and Equity in Latin America and the Caribbean : Evidence from Selected Countries

Local Agency Costs of Political Centralization – A lecture by Roger Myerson

photoby Genevieve Jeffrey ’15, current student in the Economics of Public Policy program.


Nobel Laureate Roger Myerson presented his latest paper, ‘Local Agency Costs of Political Centralization’ to the Barcelona GSE community on the 3rd of June.

The central focus of the paper is to examine how efficient the widely accepted notion of Political Centralisation is.

Some existing literature already argues that political decentralization and community empowerment may be the key to successful development. They show how autonomous local governments can reduce entry barriers in national politics. Creating the space for success on a smaller scale can lead to them becoming strong candidates for higher office. The decentralization of power also gives local leaders a stake in nation building.

Others argue that one centralized government could also have the same effects by applying differentiated policies accounting for regional differences.

myerson

The need for targeted policies for differing dynamics in different regions is clear but the way to achieve this is still being explored. Myerson comes in with this paper is to show that in order to achieve efficient local public investment there needs to be accountability which is best achieved with decentralization of power.

The mechanism he uses to analyze this issue is a model of moral hazard in local public services in which an efficient solution is only feasible when officials are held accountable to local voters.

Political Decentralization can lead to Accountability

If the quality of the local public services can only be observed by the local residents, then unless the residents have power over the officials’ career, they will not be accountable.

If the local residents do not have the power to dismiss the officials, their careers would depend more on political relationships than on effectively managing local public services. This would have a roundabout effect on development as without good public services, private investments would be scarce since the success of these investments would depend on the quality of these public services.

In his talk he expounded on the following example to illustrate his findings. In a remote town, if we imagine each resident invests to start an enterprise whose probability of success would depend on the amount spent on public services in the town. The only observable evidence that the official spent the money on public services would be the number of successes among the residents’ enterprises.

This budget is managed by the local official, who could divert any part to his personal consumption. What Myerson shows is that there is a premium that can be paid to the official in addition to his salary that would incentivize the official to stay. This would make up the moral hazard rents and allow the efficient amount of investment to be spent.

Equilibria

Myerson shows that for a given budget if the official is paid ‘p’ if a specified fraction of residents report success then the renewal thresholds and official salaries can be set as functions of the local population ‘n’ that would result in the efficient budget and induced public investment levels.

Distrust and Instability

However if there were distrust, the voters would rather replace the incumbent if they expect the funds to be stolen in the future. In this case, public investment and residents’ benefits would be a decreasing function of the political instability parameter ‘q’. However as long as the utility from the induced public investment for the given level of instability is positive, residents can still benefit.

Autocracy – Rulers Incentive

In an autocracy the national ruler can commit to allow the town to elect an autonomous local government in exchange for a tax the residents would pay until their utility is maximized.

Moral hazard rents would be paid by candidates in terms of cash or political support. The autocracy could offer these offices as rewards for support and help them ward off challengers in this way.

If the national ruler could credibly commit to allow an autonomous local government after picking the first incumbent local official, the ruler could gain fiscal and political benefits per resident. But for this to happen, the ruler must make a credible commitment to the division of power constitutionally which would be against his interests ex-post.

With local accountability then the ruler would not be able to use the offices as rewards as this would make him vulnerable to voters distrust.

If successful they could be serious contenders for national office competing against him. This may be politically too costly for the incumbent national leader.

Separation of Information from Influence in an Autocracy

Key supporters are important for the success of any leader. A leader can get more support when key supporters monitor how he treats others so not rewarding one would cause distrust in all. If successful, competitors cannot recruit supporters without constraints.

Since an autocratic ruler is only accountable to these courtiers, they must deter wrongful dismissals as he can resell the vacant offices with moral hazard rents.

Courtiers can impose political costs on the ruler but these costs cannot depend on information that the ruler would be able to manipulate.

Courtiers could impose a penalty on the ruler depending on the set of dismissed officials. They should choose this penalty such that the dismissal set is a small fraction of all offices. If the net service value the ruler would get from replacing the official would equal his penalty for dismissal, the ruler would pick the dismissal set based on information on public services. However on the other hand, he might choose to dismiss those with the best services as they may prove to be strong contenders and rivals.

Under democracies also, political leaders need the reputation of rewarding patronage to motivate supporters. Under democracy, local autonomy threatens to increase competitive entry into national politics against the interest of national officials. One example of this given was Pakistan. National democratic competition also raises the political risk for the retention of appointees.

However if Local Accountability leads to better Public Services could Democracy induce leaders to promise it?

An analysis shows that with sequential bids the challenger can win by offering marginally more in most districts and zero where the incumbent spends the most. Contrary to the optimal socially, this will lead to small offers everywhere.

Endogenous Decentralization in a Unitary Democracy

However if public budgets are fixed as in most cases, then candidates can compete based on promises of accountability of the local officials. An alternative for this would be for the candidate to sell the office for a political contribution and then spend this money obtained on the campaign. This would win over the uninformed voters while the informed would vote for the best promise. This result thus depends on the proportion of the population that is informed.

Inefficient Centralization in a Unitary Democracy

Citing the example of Ukraine, Myerson also warned of the possibility of politically neglected regions being dangerous for a nations territorial integrity if it facilitated the opportunity for disaffected regions to secede. In an equilibrium of a 2-candidate election for national leadership of a unitary state, each candidate would naturally maintain inefficient centralized management of local public services in a fraction of all districts.

In Sum

The key points were that moral hazard in local public investments can be efficiently managed with local accountability. When the public services can only be observed by local residents, officials can only be held accountable if their careers depend on the resident’s approval. Political decentralization would guarantee such local power.

However if the leader can resell offices then he would not a neutral judge of the local public services. In the specific case of a centralized autocracy, dismissal must be approved by the national elite and residents cannot communicate their complaints to them, so without a guarantee of local political rights there can be no credible commitment to sustain efficient local investments by the autocratic national government.

Full Barcelona GSE Lecture by Roger Myerson:

Alumni Voices: micro-foundations, mid-life crises, and more

Links to Barcelona GSE alumni voices around the web

Alumni Voices

Alumni Voices is a roundup of links to recent analysis, research, and commentary by Barcelona GSE graduates that we’ve spotted around the web. 

Alumni Voices – April 2015

Want us to add your work to the next roundup? Send us the link!

How should economics be taught? A conversation with Vicenç Navarro

Hugo Ferradans

 

By Hugo Ferradans, current student in the Barcelona GSE Master in Economics of Public Policy. Follow him on Twitter @Hferradans.

 


Vicenç Navarro“In my over 50 years of academic life, the 1% has never had as much influence in shaping the knowledge of economics as it does now.”

UPF Professor Vicenç Navarro, author of Podemos’ electoral program, talks about the way economics is taught today and some of the policies put forward by Podemos.

Vicenç Navarro is currently a professor and the director of the Public Policy program both in Pompeu Fabra and John Hopkins University. Being one of the most internationally cited researchers in the field of social sciences, Vicenç Navarro is an economist, political theorist and sociologist who has been widely recognized for challenging neoliberal approaches to the study of economics. Together with professor Juan Torres, he is the author of the controversial electoral program put forward by Podemos, where they advocate for a strong public sector and welfare state, as well as a move away from an economy based on speculative industries like construction. Love-him or hate-him, Navarro’s strong opinions have been able to shake the current economic academia and Spain’s political scenario – and we are here to ask him about it.

Part 1: Reflections on the way Economics is taught today

Hugo Ferradáns (HF) – There is little doubt that neoclassical economics has contributed to a very large extent to the study of economics and social sciences. Nevertheless, it seems that this neoclassical school of thought has monopolized the economic syllabus in top universities around the United States and Europe, leaving alternative economic perspectives ignored.

You suggest in a number of articles that many of the economic policies that are being implemented currently in Europe come from specific power relations within the Eurozone (European Central Bank and the IMF against anti-austerity movements in Greece, Spain, etc.). In relation to the study of economics, how does the lack of teaching about institutions and politics in the economic curriculum, as well as the lack of debate against the foundations of neoclassical theories, are limiting our understanding of today’s economic and political scene?

Vicenç Navarro (VN) – One of the major problems we encounter in the production of economic knowledge is its excessive disciplinary approach. Actually, the academic institutions are usually divided by departments based on disciplines, one of them being economics. The reality that surrounds us, however, cannot be understood following the disciplinary approach. The understanding of our realities, including the economic ones, calls for a multidisciplinary analysis, with the understandings of the historical, political and social forces that shape and determine that reality. In order to understand the current Great Recession, for example, we have to understand how power—class power, race power, gender power, national power—is produced and reproduced through political institutions, as well as social and cultural ones. In other words, we have to comprehend how power relations shape the governance of our societies, including their economies.

Modern economics is used as a way of confusing and/or ignoring the political realities that shape the economy.

The current economics, for the most part, do not do that. They specialize in branches of the tree without understanding, or even less, questioning, the nature of the forest. Moreover, they have given great emphasis to the methods, depoliticizing the realities of the economic phenomenon. Today, modern economics is used as a way of confusing and/or ignoring the political realities that shape the economy. Currently, most of the major economic problems we face are basically political.
You cannot understand, for example, the current crisis in Europe without understanding the decline of labor income, and, thus, of domestic demand; this is the result of the changing power relations—primarily class power relations—that have occurred in the last thirty years. You can also not explain the crisis without understanding the enormous influence of financial capital on the European Central Bank. To try to explain reality by referring to the working of the financial markets as a point of departure is profoundly wrong and naïve. Financial markets have very little to do with markets. It was enough for Mario Draghi, the President of the European Central Bank, to speak a sentence, to reduce the interest rates dramatically.

The absence of the study of the political and social context, determined historically, makes current economics an apologetic message for current power relations, mystifying, hiding, and/or confusing the understanding of the economic phenomena. It is not surprising, therefore, that the critical traditions within economies are completely ignored or marginalized. It is predictable that current economists did not perceive the arrival of the current recession, which is a Great Depression for millions of Europeans. Only analysts from critical traditions were able to predict it. And we did it.

HF – Many people would ask why are historical and political contexts so ignored in the economics syllabus if they are so important to understand economics. Does this rejection come from a clash of interests between economic and political powers and Universities, or was it a slow transition towards a neoclassical orthodoxy led by the academia?

VN – The current emphasis on methods and its analysis of the economic reality without looking at the political context that determines it is a consequence of changes in the power relations in our societies. The apologetic function of current economies of the current power relations explains its lack of relevance. What we have been seeing since the 80s has been the enormous growth of income derived from capital, and the decline of income from labor. This has resulted in the drastic growth of inequalities.

The influence of financial and economic institutions in the production of knowledge is enormous.

But those who derive their income from capital have enormous influence on value-generating systems, including the media and universities. This is extremely clear in the US but is happening also in the European universities. Today, the influence of financial and economic institutions in the production of knowledge is enormous. They fund research, support economic journals, and shape, to a large degree, the academic culture in the area of economics. It is very similar to what happens in medicine where the pharmaceutical industry has a major influence in shaping clinical knowledge and practice.

In my over 50 years of academic life, never has the 1% (those who derive their income from capital) had as much influence in shaping the knowledge of economics. The situation in Spain is even worse than in the US, due to the lack of public funds for economic research. The major research institutions are funded by major banks or major corporations. This explains the dominance of the neoliberal ideology in most academic forums, journals, and major media.

HF – Does this influence go beyond universities? How does this affect democracy in Europe and the United States?

VN – The influence of what now is called the 1% on society affects all institutions that reproduce information and knowledge, from the major media in a country to the university, and now including the entire educational system, starting with the schools. The expansion of the teaching of economics to the school systems in an intent to expand a vision of reality that is in accordance with conventional wisdom in a country, the wisdom shaped by the 1%, and its allied classes (which includes approximately another 10% of the population).

Part 2: Public policy in Spain

HF – Moving now to policy in Spain, we would like to talk about the role of media in democracy. The importance of and the ways to achieve a plural media independent from public institutions and economic powers has been subject of intense debate over the past years due to its relevance to democratic quality. As an example, Prat and Strömberg (2011) suggest that to achieve this plural and independent media we need to encourage financially independent outlets. McChesney and Schiller (2003), however, focus on the importance of public media as a way to insulate outlets from being controlled by corporations.

In the economic program that Podemos presented, of which you are one of the authors, you suggest that there should be a “separation by law between the property of financial groups and communication outlets, thus ensuring the independence of all media companies from the government and large corporations” (page 10). Furthermore, you mention that there should be a “legislation that provides a minimum quota of independent public media outlets”, by which “no company could take more than the 15% of the total media market” (page 10).

Many people would question these policies, arguing that independence and quality in media markets are not necessarily achieved by constraining private companies and expanding public media outlets. Many examples of private media outlets that are independent of private corporations can be given, such as The Guardian, The New York Times and even La Sexta in Spain. How would an increase in the presence of public media outlets improve the independence of media from economic and political powers in Spain? Isn’t the problem of media independence about a casta that operates both at the private and public level?

VN – Today, financial capital—primarily banks and insurance companies—have the dominant voice in the major media. In Spain this is obvious. All major media are in deep debt and are in the hands of the banks. It is because of this that Professor Juan Torres and I indicated in our economic proposals for the new party Podemos that that linkage should be discontinued, because it enormously limits the necessary ideological diversity that should exist in any democracy. Today, there is no such diversity in Spain.

But that situation is not unique in Spain. I have lived for many years in the United States, teaching at the Johns Hopkins University for over fifty years, and ideological diversity is also very limited in that country. Rarely, if ever, will you see intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky in the major media. Incidentally, I have to correct you regarding The New York Times in the US and La Sexta in Spain. The largest groups of members on the Editorial Board of the NYT are related to insurance companies and banking. This explains the hostility of that daily to the specific single-payer proposal for reforming health care in the US. This proposal, put forward by the left of the Democratic Party and the labor union would be a model of the health care system that already exists in Canada, and would eliminate private health insurance within the publicly funded system.

And La Sexta is owned by economic and financial interests that also fund some of the extreme right-wing media, like La Razon. They allow some space for the left, but always in a very limited way. They expose those critical voices because they realize that the audience increases when critical voices are allowed. But the major owner supervises the production and do not leave much space for progressive forces.

HF – The economic program of Podemos also argues that it would encourage the presence of small and medium size companies to foster employment creation.

The Economist published an article called “Supersize me” (February 21, 2015) arguing that a lack of larger firms in Spain means fewer jobs and a less resilient economy. In particular, it mentions that “bigger firms tend to be more resilient in hard times than smaller ones. In Britain, for example, large companies – those with more than 250 workers – provide almost half of all private-sector jobs, compared with just a quarter in Spain. The Círculo de Empresarios calculates that if Spain had the same mix of firms as Britain, it would have lost half a million fewer jobs since the global financial crisis.”

From this perspective, what is attractive about medium and small size firms in an economy with such high unemployment rate, and what makes big corporations not a good option to overcome the challenges that Spain is facing today? How would this influence unemployment for young people?

VN – The major economic problems existing in Spain are not the size of the enterprises. Most of the largest Spanish enterprises used to be public enterprises that were privatized and run by friends of the governing parties. Many of them are less efficient than they were when they were public. Some of the major private banks that have run into major problems have been banks that used to be public. And even public banks were forced to act as private banks. And that is one of the major problems. Private banking in Spain is far too large. Spain is the country in the European Union with the smallest public banking sector. It is also one of the countries where it is most difficult to get credit. This, and the lack of demand due to the large reduction of wages (the lowest wages in the EU) and cuts in public expenditures (the lowest public expenditure in the EU) are the causes of the recession and limited recovery.

If Spain had the same percentage of adults working in the welfare State as Sweden, it would have about four million more people working then it has now.

The greatest need in Spain to restructure the economy, changing its dependency on sectors very prone to speculation, like construction. Also, contrary to what the 1% in Spain claims, the public sector is very underdeveloped. If Spain had the same percentage of adults working in the welfare State as Sweden, it would have about four million more people working then it has now.

HF – In your opinion, then, what would you say is Spain’s biggest challenge from an economic and political point of view, and what could the country do to overcome it?

VN – I would say that the biggest problem Spain is facing right now is the very limited democracy that it exists in the country. The transition from dictatorship to democracy in Spain took place in conditions very favorable to the conservative forces that controlled the State and the media. As a consequence, the Spanish state has a very limited democracy and underfunded welfare state. There is a need for a transition from the dramatically insufficient democracy to a real democracy, with active participation of the citizenship in the governance of the country.


Follow Vicenç Navarro on Twitter @VicencNavarro

For a longer discussion on Spain’s past, present and future, check Vicenç’s Navarro El subdesarrollo social de España: causas y consecuencias, available in most bookshops around the country.

Photo Diary: Exams Winter 2015

How masters and PhD students are surviving finals this month…

Staking out a cozy corner in the library

 

It’s all about the snacks

 

Moments of Zen

 

A little help from our friends

 

Have a photo you’d like to share? Email it to thevoice@barcelonagse.eu or mention @barcelonagse on Twitter or Instagram

‘Why Nations Fail’ and Spain’s rent-seeking system

Spain’s political class and institutions have behaved in an extractive manner. This situation is largely due to a structural system of rent extraction, both at a institutional and cultural level, that drives the creation of wealth to the benefit of a few.

photo

 

By Hugo Ferradans, current student in the Barcelona GSE Master in Economics of Public Policy. Follow him on Twitter @Hferradans.

 


 

In 2012, MIT professors Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson published one of the most compelling and resourceful books I have read in the field of development economics: Why Nations Fail. Their work suggests that the existence of extractive institutions and an extractive political class constraints to a large extent the ability of a country to experience prosperity and economic success.

book coverAcemoglu and Robinson define extractive institutions as those institutions that create a system that moves resources from the many to a small powerful elite. In this sense, institutions that are extractive do not secure property rights to the population, nor provide an unbiased justice system that caters for the interests of the powerless. Many examples are given: North Korea vs. South Korea, Mexico vs. the United States, etc., drawing the conclusion that, if a society operates under the rule of a state that fails to create institutions that are democratic, a state will be bound to fail and not achieve a decent level of prosperity.

Although Acemoglu and Robinson’s work focuses on the relevance of extractive institutions in developing countries, this article will show how the argument could be easily expanded to developed countries like Spain.

Indeed, after many years of economic boom where money was flowing ferociously into the economy, Spain appears to have reached an economic and political cul-de-sac. Where did all the money go? How can it be that Spain is now leading the charts of extreme child poverty in the European Union, and at the same time is the country with the highest number of high-speed trains and empty houses in Europe?

photo
Placard says “people without a home, homes without people,” highlighting how Spain has a huge amount of empty houses and a growing number of homeless people. Photo: La Vanguardia

At this point is where Why Nations Fail becomes appealing to me. I put forward the idea that Spain’s political class and institutions have behaved in an extractive manner and that this situation is largely due to a structural system of rent extraction, both at a institutional and cultural level, that drives the creation of wealth to the benefit of a few.

It is important to clarify, though, that this article appreciates that the extent to which Spain’s institutions are extractive is not the same as the ones described in Why Nations Fail. Spanish institutions do secure property rights and provide certain mechanisms to achieve a satisfactory level of development and economic growth. However, the construction and housing bubbles, as well as today’s economic policies put forward by the conservative party Partido Popular, suggest how many institutions are fuelling a system that perpetuates a ruling elite without trickling wealth down to the rest of the population.

I would like to introduce, not only at a political-economy-theory level, but also looking at a number of historical qualitative and quantitative data, how Acemoglu and Robinson’s discourse is crucial to understand today’s political and economic situation in Spain, and how a move towards a greater democratic and prosperous country will only be achieved by a regeneration of Spain’s political class.

Some history: from the 17th century until today

Hidalgos
Meeting of hidalgos in Valladolid, Spain

The creation of a very dense and static political and economic elite in Spain can be traced back to the 16th and 17th centuries. The combination between an absolutist government and a system of privileges that encouraged the middle class to abandon productive work and constitute tax-free property entails, created an elite (the so-called hidalguía) that was characterized by a rejection to culture and class mobility. Indeed, this elite was very supportive of the emergence of rent-seeking structures, as seen in the massive increase of mayorazgos during the decline of the Spanish empire, which ensured that the hidalguía could not see their capital reduced but only increased. In this way, even though Spain was being hit hardly by an economic turmoil at the beginning of the 17th century, the elite managed to keep their wealth at the expense of the whole population.

Such mechanisms of extraction from the population endured continuously over history, protecting the power of the government, the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie 1. It was not until the Second Republic (1930-1936) that Spain’s political elite was questioned. The Second Republic was a period in Spanish history where the government started to impose a number of very progressive and democratic policies, and where the cultural elites started to have a say in politics. Nevertheless, this ‘insurrection’ ended up being highly suppressed by a coup d’état from the military, obviously led by the previous political elite. This caused a Civil War that ultimately drove Spain into 40 years of a dictatorial regime under the rule of Francisco Franco, who brought back the previous system of corruption and rent-extraction to the country.

After Franco’s death, the transition to democracy was the result of a compromise between the old dictatorship heirs and a new class of younger politicians that had been organized in underground movements. Under these circumstances, the new democracy inherited many of the ways of doing politics that were customary of the Francoist regime. It is certainly not surprising, thus, that such an extended and static elitist system continued until today. In fact, the development of rent-seeking institutions that provided systems of extraction is something so ingrained in the Spanish society that it endured after the transition to democracy.

The construction and housing bubbles

This article puts forward the idea that one of the major exponents of such a system were the construction and housing bubbles. A huge expenditure in public infrastructure, both at the local and state levels, as well as a facilitation of housing construction by the local and regional governments has been a distinctive feature of Spanish politics over the last decades. Although many politicians have tried to argue that such a level of investment in public infrastructure was a way to provide the population with a system of “common welfare”, this political discourse seemed to confuse allocating public resources for construction of essential public transport systems, like fast-train lines and airports, with the supplying of unnecessary infrastructures in order to get private gain, such as, for example, Castellon’s airport, which has been opened since 2011 but has not managed to attract any flights yet.

Where institutions create culture: Spain’s ‘culture of ownership’

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A Spanish family right before being evicted from their homes. Evictions have been a major problem in Spain recently, where banks kept evicting people from their homes and families still had to pay their debt to the bank after being evicted. Photo: The New York Times / Samuel Aranda

The Spanish housing market has been a case-study for many economists for showing some unusual features. One of the most prominent ones is the level of homeownerships when compared to the average European countries– 87% of Spanish population is living in owned rather than rented houses, in contrast with the 60% average of Europe. Many politicians have encouraged this market structure by stating that Spain has an innate ‘culture of ownership’ as opposed to other European countries, and thus Spaniards should follow this ‘Spanish way of life’. Nevertheless, this was not the case not that long ago. In fact, in 1950, 51% of the population lived under a rented property, and even in some cities such as Madrid and Barcelona this figure could increase up to 85%, indicating that this ‘Spanish way of life’ was more imposed by public institutions than ingrained in the DNA of the Spanish population, something that is consistent with Why Nations Fail’s argument that culture does not precede politics, but rather politics creates culture.

This change was fuelled by the minister of housing in 1957, José Luís Arrese, who, after stating the famous quote “Spain needs to be a country of owners, not of proletarians”, presented a political project to confront the increasing number of shacks in the metropolitan areas of cities. In this project, Arrese committed to undergo a series of reforms, such as a massive investment to build new houses and fiscal reforms to provide the majority of the population with their “right for adequate housing”. Although the number of social houses built during this period of time were almost nonexistent, many of the reforms that characterized the last decades of the Francoist regime marked a point of inflexion in the emergence of a ‘country of owners’ in Spain. In fact, housing started to be seen by the political elites as a mechanism of social control by which the revolutionary desires of the working classes could be brought down. Making the working classes subordinates not only to the state, but also to the national banks that provided them with credit, gave the regime a new sense in the ways they could control the population and undergo their political project. Expanding ownership and the housing sector would not only bring economic growth, but also political stability. This was clearly stated by Arrese, who mentioned in a speech in 1957:

“Man, when not given a proper shelter, tries to take over to the streets and, controlled by his bad mood, becomes subversive, bitter and violent.”

Nevertheless, the poor social housing provision and the systematic speculation that gave the elites notorious economic revenue produced an environment of total political disaffection and lack of credibility. In fact, many of the national companies that created this boom in housing during the 60s were extremely linked to the richest families in the country, some members of which were even part of the political and administrative elites as well.

Furthermore, this desire to build a culture of homeownership further continued after the implementation of democracy, indicating again how housing was a mechanism of the elites to satisfy their interests. In 1985 and 1988, new reforms undertaken by the socialist government gave homeownership fiscal preference over renting. Buying a house could decrease by 15 to 17 percent the amount of income tax paid to the government. Also, Spain is the country with the lowest expenditure in social housing in Europe, spending 48.5 Euros per capita in contrast with the 117.06 of the European average. In this way, social housing did not expand in the years of the housing bubble because it ended up not being profitable for building companies. Thus, although the demand for social housing was increasing massively due to the systematic rise of housing prices in the real-estate market, the supply of social housing remained static, making it difficult for low-income families to buy a decent house.

The systematic fiscal compensations and the creation of a general belief by politicians that a house was ‘the best investment because prices never went down’ produced a general propensity for buying instead of renting. However, although the policies regarding tax discount for house ownership were massively applauded by the public, the real effects of these policies were neutral for consumers. The deduction of the tax for homeownership was actually compensated by the overpriced houses in the market, ultimately making the sellers, being big building companies and private banks, the only ones who benefited from this system of rent extraction. Furthermore, the political class was so linked to this culture of ownership and speculation that they would intensely benefit from the increase in prices and the rise in construction. In fact, many of the MPs in the national parliament owned more than three houses in 2011.

A political framework: the laws of urban planning

Besides the fuelling of a culture of ownership, Spain’s political class also created a framework in which speculation could operate freely, mainly taking the form of laws of urban planning that favoured mass construction.

In 1956, the Spanish government put forward the first law of urban development, which gave local councils the competencies to define whether an area was urban (suitable for building) or rural (unsuitable for building), as well as to determine the density of the construction to be taken place, making local governments able to redefine the land value of a specific area within a municipality.

However, this law was rather restrictive in some of the requirements for determining whether a piece of land is fit for urban development. To regulate and fuel the massive construction of houses during the housing bubble, successive governments put forward new laws that eased these requirements, such as the Law 7/1997 of 14th of April 1997 applied by José María Aznar, which allowed urban development in virtually any land throughout the country. In this way, local governments were able to easily increase the land value of particular unused areas by giving them an urban title. This fed the emergence of corruption during the housing boom years, since local governments could easily benefit the economic elites by increasing land values through giving land areas an urban title.

Furthermore, this new law gave local authorities the ability to issue building permits according to their local urban plan. In possession of a building permit, landowners were entitled to start with the building or urbanization project, having, however, the legal duty to give 10 percent to 15 percent of the total construction costs of the new urban development to the local authority. Both the state and landowners, thus, had very strong incentives to expand urban land, since local authorities could benefit financially from expanding areas of urbanisation and landowners could retain much of the value of their already valuable lands. Many municipalities were intensely financed by these forms of revenue, as seen in Valencia.

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An unused street in Benidorm, which used to be a famous tourist destination in Spain. Some parts of the city have become ghost towns as many skyscrapers and constructions were stopped after the burst of the bubble. Photo: The New York Times / Samuel Aranda.

In addition, the decisions about the land title given to certain areas within a municipality tended to be signed by local authorities and private companies privately through the so-called convenios urbanísticos, which actually lacked any kind of transparency and regulation by the state. Politicians and private companies could negotiate many of the conditions for urban development in a city without a formal legal framework that regulated a possible case of interests in the negotiation of the convenio urbanístico.

It is important to differentiate how Spain’s legal framework is different from other similar developed countries in Europe. Indeed, many countries give councils the ability to decide the nature of lands in cities. Cities in France and Germany, for example, are also able to do so. In Spain, however, there is a system that gives private companies and local authorities incentives to expand urban land and build. Since local governments will get a big amount of revenue from giving building permits to private companies, they will deliberately do so to finance their debt. Also, since the negotiations between public and private actors were not regulated, local authorities and companies set urban policies to generate capital gains for the elites at the expense not only of creating a bubble in the economy, but also at the expense of environmental deterioration too.

The inefficient judicial system: a matter of resources?

Lastly, this article will briefly focus on Spain’s judicial system. On the basis of Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2013) theoretical framework, a state that is not providing a system that “prevents theft and fraud” would be “failing to secure property rights and justice” among the population, and thus becomes extractive. In this sense, if Spain is not promoting a system that is independent from other actors such as the political elites and that controls the evolution of extractive activities from any agent in the economy, especially from the ones in power, it will be contributing indirectly to the existence of this rent-seeking society.

The current judicial system in Spain is very inefficient. The average time that takes a trial to proceed with a resolution is one of the highest in Europe, sometimes taking 10 year to know the outcome. The media and many politicians have argued that this problem is due to the lack of resources given to the judicial institutions. However, Spain’s expenditure on justice is 50% higher than in France, and only 10% lower than Germany. Also, the number of judges per 100,000 inhabitants is similar to the one in France.

The problem, thus, must go beyond a simple analysis of the resources given to its institutions. One of the main problems, and it is indeed connected to the construction bubble, is the overlap of the political class and the judicial system. The two main parties, PSOE and PP, control the judges through the General Judicial Board (CGPJ), the major institution of Spain that promotes the independence of the judicial system from the parliament and the senate. In fact, although in 1980 a law that established that 12 of the members of the CGPJ were chosen by other judges was put forward, this law was derogated in 1985, giving the Parliament the power to choose all of the 20 members of the CGPJ. From this moment on, the CGPJ became a body used by the political class to rule for their own interests, where both political parties are constantly replacing the members of the chamber every time they come into power. It is not surprising, thus, that a study put forward by the World Economic Forum places Spain in the 60th position out of 133 in terms of the independence of the judicial system in front of the parliament, the senate and many private companies, being behind countries such as Namibia, Botswana and Gambia.

Regarding the cases of corruption that rose during the boom years, many of the trials about political scandals are still not resolved because of both the inefficiency of the judicial system and the poor dependence from the political parties that the system of justice has. One of the clearest examples is the Gürtel case, where the power of the political parties over the justice system was uncovered by the suspension of the judge Baltasar Garzón, the one that started its investigation. Indeed, when many front-line politicians from the government of Valencia and the Autonomous Community of Madrid started to be accused of bribery, money laundering and tax evasion in relation to the construction activities, a number of right-wing parties, of which some were involved with the politicians accused, put forward a lawsuit against him for causes unrelated to the Gürtel case.

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Judge Baltazar Garzón. Photo: El Mundo

After a long process of investigation, the CGPJ decided to move Baltasar Garzón aside the case and suspend him as a judge for 10 years. Currently the investigation is still ongoing. Most of the front-line politicians that were related in the case, such as Francisco Camps, were not found guilty.

The fact that the Spanish judicial system is failing to impose the rule of law to prevent theft and fraud is not a matter of opinion. Many studies have analysed the trust that the public has towards the judicial system, finding that it presents one of the lowest in Europe, being at the same level as Greece and Bulgaria. The effects that this can have on the evolution of further rent-seeking activities similar to the housing bubble are massive, since politicians know that being involve in corrupted activities will not be punished by law.

Challenging the establishment

This article has focused on the manifold ways in which Spain’s institutions have created a system of rent-extraction, with specific attention to the construction and housing bubbles. Although this issue calls for a more extensive and resourced analysis, I believe that Acemoglu and Robinson’s theoretical framework provides a good starting point.

This article has concluded that Spanish institutions are extractive for the following reasons. First, it was argued that Spain has been historically a country with a strong political elite that rules for the interest of the elites. Institutions constantly created a culture that perpetuated a system of rent extraction, as seen in the creation of the mayorazgos, as well as the ‘culture of ownership’ so acclaimed during the housing boom years. Second, institutions and major politicians not only promoted a certain culture that benefited them, but also a national administrative and political structure that fuelled the construction sector, and thus ultimately moving public resources into their hands. Finally, politicians also fuelled the creation of a non-independent judicial system that ensures that corruptive activities are generally not charged by law.

It is crucial that Spanish citizens challenge the establishment. Some moves from new political parties, such as Podemos, appear to be opening a door for this. Nevertheless, it is still not clear how the political scene will change in the following months. There is much to come, and hopefully Spain will realize about this vital challenges.

References

  1. Colau, Ada. Vidas Hipotecadas. Lectio, 2012.
  2. Drelichman, Mauricio. “All that glitters: Precious Metals, rent seeking and the decline of Spain.” European Review of Economic History 9(3), 313-336 (2005).
  3. Molinas, César. Qué Hacer Con España? Destino, 2013.
  4. Navarro, Vicenç. “El subdesarrollo social de España.” Público, October 22, 2009.

[1] For example, the mayorazgos were not abolished until the 19th centruy.

Effectiveness of primary care ValCRÒNIC teleHealth program

Editor’s note: This post is part of a series showcasing Barcelona GSE master projects by students in the Class of 2014. The project is a required component of every master program.


Effectiveness of primary care ValCRÒNIC teleHealth program: outcome findings on mortality and healthcare service consumption in patients with high-risk chronic conditions. A cohort study with matched controls in Valencia community, Spain.

Author:

Sherman Kong

Master Program:

Health Economics and Policy

Paper Abstract:

We analyze the mortality and hospitalization level of 512 patients enrolled in the ValCRÒNIC teleHealth program in Valencia public health region with a matched control of 1023 patients with same risk profiles. We obtain medical records of patient sample for 12 months before start of trial and follow-up on consumption level from hospital and primary care facilities for 12 months during program. We observed utilization level before and after trial and found an increase in primary care nurse and home care visitations. We used logistic and zero-inflated Poisson models to estimate effect of program enrollment to intense acute hospital use, deaths and avoidable hospitalization rate. We found insignificant benefits to reducing mortality and intense acute hospital use.

Author’s note: This paper is a work in progress, pending revision of results.

Read the full paper or view slides below:

A bullet a day keeps the doctor away: the effect of war over health expenditure

Editor’s note: This post is part of a series showcasing Barcelona GSE master projects by students in the Class of 2014. The project is a required component of every master program.


A bullet a day keeps the doctor away: the effect of war over health expenditure

Authors:

Rita Abdel Sater and María José Ospina Fadul

Master Program:

Health Economics and Policy

Project Summary:

Although there is an ongoing debate on how much an increase in health expenditure would actually improve the health condition of its population (as this relation also depends in factor such as efficiency), the truth is that the level of expenditure in many developing countries is still under the basic needed level suggested by the World Health Organization. Furthermore, it has become clear that the public budget plays a fundamental role in the financing of a health system: in fact, the public expenditure on health should increase by 5% on average in these countries to provide the basic conditions in order to accomplish the millennium goals. However, the struggle to achieve acceptable levels of health expenditure has faced several obstacles. This article intends to determine if war is in fact one of them.

Within this context, this article tries to determine the effect of war over health expenditure level and composition, particularly in terms of the public budget participation. So far several articles have examined the effects of war over public health but none have determined the effect that it has over the levels and the composition of the health expenditure. Additionally, this article contributes to the existent literature in the sense that it classifies conflicts as high or low intensity and discerners between these two when determining their effect over health expenditure.

We used panel data on the 27 countries that had both episodes of war and episodes of peace in the period that goes from 1995 to 2008. We applied clustering techniques to classify these conflicts as high or low intensity and after this we used Arellano-Bond estimators to determine the effect of war over the level and composition of health expenditure.

Sample and intensity classification
Sample and intensity classification

 

Surprisingly, we found that low intensity wars have a negative and statistically significant effect over health expenditure while there seems to be no effect when there is a high intensity war. Moreover, we found that public expenditure in health increases when there is a high intensity war while there is no change in the composition when there is a low intensity war. These results suggest that when there is a high intensity conflict the decrease in private investment in health is compensated by an increase in public expenditure, while in countries exposed to low intensity wars the decrease in private expenditure is not equalized by an increase in public expenditure.

Finally, in terms of the compositions of this expenditure we found that the public expenditure in health as a percentage of total public expenditure stays the same in countries exposed to high intensity conflicts while it decreases in countries with low intensity conflicts. These results, in combinations with the former, provide empirical evidence to support Peacock and Wiseman’s expenditure displacement theory according to which public expenditure increases during times of crisis.